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Contesting Austerity: The Potential and
Pitfalls of Socioeconomic Rights Discourse
JOE WILLS* AND BEN

TC WARWICK**

This article argues that, while socioeconomic rights have the
potential to contribute to the contestation of austerity measures and the
reimaginingof a "postneoliberal"order, there are a number of features of
socioeconomic rights as currently constructed under international law
that limit these possibilities. We identify these limitations as falling into
two categories: "contingent"and "structural." Contingent limitations are
shortcomings in the current constitution of socioeconomic rights law that
undermine its effectiveness for challenging austerity measures. By
contrast, the structurallimitations of socioeconomic rights law are those
that pertain to the more basic presuppositionsand axioms that provide
the foundations for legal rights discourse. We address these limitations
and conclude by arguing that it is possible to harness the strengths of
socioeconomic rights discourse while mitigating its shortcomings. A key
element in moving beyond these shortcomings is the development of an
understanding of such rights as just one component in a portfolio of
counterhegemonic discourses that can be mobilized to challenge
neoliberalism and austerity.
INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the century Perry Anderson described neoliberalism
as "the most successful ideology in world history."1 Since those words
were written, neoliberalism has undergone a series of crises, and
following the 2008 financial meltdown there has been an unprecedented
public debate concerning the relevance, credibility, and durability of
neoliberalism as an economic, political, and social order. 2 The financial
crash, widely attributed to the failure of governments to effectively
*
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1. Perry Anderson, Renewals, 1 NEW LEFT REV. 1, 13 (2000).
2. See Stephen Gill, Introduction: Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership,
in GLOBAL CRISES AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 1, 4-8 (Stephen Gill ed., 2012).
**
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regulate the financial sector, has undoubtedly dealt a heavy blow to the
free market credo that is integral to neoliberalism's ideological selfrepresentation.3 Many mainstream commentators have joined radical
opponents of neoliberalism in asserting the unsustainability of the
current economic order. 4 Indeed, the impact of the crisis even led the
associate editor and chief economics commentator at the London
Financial Times to declare that "[t]he world of the past three decades
5
has gone."
Despite the challenge seemingly posed to the legitimacy of
neoliberalism by the current economic crisis, assumptions that
neoliberalism is dead or that we have now moved to a "postneoliberal
world" are premature. 6 Indeed, it is clear that the response to economic
recession by many national governments and global governance
organizations has been to impose austerity, cut social protection, and
further privatize and commodify pensions, health care, and education.7
In other words, the structural and discursive power of neoliberalism has
enabled the economic recession to be "used by many Western
governments as a means of further entrenching the neoliberal model."8
The International Monitory Fund (IMF), European Commission, and
the European Central Bank's joint promotion and enforcement of
austerity and privatization in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and
Ireland in response to the economic crisis in the Eurozone demonstrates
the continued pervasiveness of neoliberal practice in global governance. 9

3. See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical
Assessment of the 'New FinancialArchitecture, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009).
See generally WHAT CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 2011).
4. See Gill, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Martin Wolf, Seeds of Its Own Destruction, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at 19.
6. See, e.g., COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011);
Manuel B. Aalbers, Neoliberalism is Dead... Long Live Neoliberalism!, 37 INT'L J. URB. &
REG'L RES. 1083 (2013).
7. See Robin Blackburn, Crisis 2.0, 72 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 34 (2011).
8. Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey & Michael Rustin, Framing Statement: After
Neoliberalism: Analysing the Present, in AFTER NEOLIBERALISM? THE KILBURN
MANIFESTO 9, 10 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 2015).
9. See William I. Robinson, The Global Capital Leviathan, 165 RADICAL PHIL. 2, 5
(2011). For an account of how neoliberal austerity became the dominant paradigm in the
post-2008 world, see generally PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO
WASTE: How NEOLIBERALISM SURVIVED THE FINANcIAL MELTDOWN (2013) (arguing that
the pervasiveness of neoliberal thought serves to further evidence its ultimate veracity).
For accounts of how neoliberalism became hegemonic, generally see Susan George, How
To Win The War Of Ideas: Lessons from the GramscianRight, DISSENT, Summer 1997, at
47; PHILIP G. CERNY, Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm,
in RETHINKING WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL NEOPLURALISM 128

(2010); David Miller, How Neoliberalism Got Where It Is: Elite Planning, Corporate
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The neoliberal "solution" to the crisis of its own making is widely
perceived as unjust and unsustainable.10 While the wealthy financial
actors responsible for the crisis were saved by public funds, the massive
public debt incurred in the wake of these bailouts is now being serviced
through austerity cuts that have disproportionately fallen upon the
already marginalized and exploited.'" The growing pressure to adopt
these measures, ostensibly for reasons of fiscal consolidation, is
undermining social protection, public health, and education programs
2
on which the vulnerable, the poor, and working people depend.'
There are innumerable critiques that could be deployed to challenge
the current neoliberal wave of "austerity politics." 13 However, this paper
will focus on the role that the discourse of socioeconomic rights might
play in contesting the current social and economic impasse. For the
purpose of this paper, socioeconomic rights are understood as the
subcategory of human rights concerned with the material bases of
human well-being.' 4 Their primary normative function is to secure a
basic quality of life for individuals and communities through
guaranteeing access to material goods and services such as food, water,
shelter, education, health care, and housing. These rights find legal
expression in a number of international instruments and national
constitutions. 15
This article will argue that socioeconomic rights discourse contains
a number of principles that can be used to interrogate the present
neoliberal austerity drive, namely the principles of progressive
resource
maximum
available
non-retrogression,
realization,
mobilization, non-discrimination and equality, minimum core duties,
and participation and accountability. These principles can serve as
important counterframes to the dominant neoliberal fixation on
competitiveness, efficiency, and economic rationality.
However, while socioeconomic rights have the potential to
contribute toward the reimagining of a "postneoliberal" order, there are

Lobbying and the Release of the Free Market, in THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERALISM:
THE COLLAPSE OF AN ECONOMIC ORDER? 23 (Kean Birch & Vlad Mykhnenko eds., 2010).
10. See generally DAVID STUCKLER & SANJAY BASu, THE BODY ECONOMIC: WHY
AUSTERITY KILLS (2013).
11. See Jan Breman, Myth of the Global Safety Net, 59 NEW LEFT REV. 29, 29 (2009).
12. See U.N. DEPT. OF ECONOMC & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE GLOBAL SOCIAL CRISIS: REPORT
ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION, at 6, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA1334, U.N. Sales No. E.10.IV.12

(2011).
13. E.g., POLITICS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY (Armin Schifer & Wolfgang Streeck eds.,
2013).

14. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Futureof the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1992).
15. See infra Section I.b.
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a number of features of socioeconomic rights as currently constructed
under international law that limit these possibilities. We identify these
limitations as falling into two categories: "contingent" and "structural."
We classify contingent limitations as shortcomings in socioeconomic
rights law as it is currently constituted that undermine its effectiveness
in challenging austerity measures. These shortcomings can be overcome
through clarifying and extending existing principles within the
normative architecture of international socioeconomic rights law. By
contrast, the structurallimitations of socioeconomic rights law are those
that pertain to the more basic presuppositions and axioms that provide
the foundations for legal rights discourse. Unlike contingent limitations,
these structural limitations cannot be overcome simply by tweaking the
extant framework. Instead, they require moving beyond, or
supplementing, appeals to legal rights with more overtly political
demands and programs.
Part I of this paper will examine key philosophical and legal
principles that underpin socioeconomic rights law which can provide a
basis for contesting neoliberal austerity measures. Part II will focus on
two contingent shortcomings of socioeconomic rights for these purposes.
The first is the failure of existing socioeconomic rights standards to
adequately address the responsibilities of transnational actors such as
the IMF and World Bank, which have played a major role in promoting
and maintaining austerity measures that have negatively impacted
socioeconomic rights. The second limitation is the absence of clear
standards with respect to the presumptive proscription of "retrogressive
measures" in the context of austerity programs. This lack of clarity on
the doctrine's criteria limits the possibilities to deploy it against cuts to
social protection systems. Part III will explore some of the structural
limitations of legal rights discourse. These include the formal and
abstract character of this discourse, well documented in critical legal
literature, and the ways this undermines its capacity to address the
systemic driving forces behind austerity and obscures, and to some
extent naturalizes, the social systems and power structures that
determine who will suffer and who will be shielded from harm. Finally,
the paper will conclude by arguing that it is possible to harness the
strengths of socioeconomic rights discourse while mitigating its
shortcomings by understanding it as just one component of a portfolio of
counterhegemonic discourses that can be mobilized to challenge
neoliberalism and austerity.
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I.

THE POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
STANDARDS

A. Neoliberalism and Socioeconomic Rights: FoundationalTensions
It is widely recognized in the human rights literature that
neoliberalism as a doctrine is hostile to socioeconomic rights at a
have rejected
neoliberals
Historically,
foundational level. 16
socioeconomic rights on two main grounds: one libertarian and one
utilitarian. The libertarian argument is based upon a conception of
"negative freedom" which holds that individuals are free when they are
not subject to coercion by others. 17 As socioeconomic rights seem to carry
the guarantee that individuals have access to certain material goods
and services-such as food, housing, and health care-neoliberals
believe that, in the final analysis, they are premised on coercive acts,
such as taxation or appropriation, and therefore undermine individual
freedom.18 The most notable of the purported interferences is with the
individual's right to private property, which is one of the central rights
of a free society for neoliberals. 19 As Erich Weede of the Cato Institute, a
libertarian think tank, puts it: "Since positive rights or entitlements
need funding, the attempt to provide positive rights requires an
infringement of negative rights, especially of the right to enjoy the fruits

16. E.g., Phillip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by
Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 826-27 (2002); Marius
Pieterse, Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of the Neo-Liberal Culture and the
Constitutional Protection of Social and Economic Rights in South Africa, 14
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 3, 14 (2003); Paul O'Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables:NeoLiberal Globalisationand Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 483, 507 (2007); RAYMOND
PLANT, THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE 116 (2010).
17. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 16-17 (1960).
18. See 2 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE MIRAGE OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 102-03 (1998 ed. 1976); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
238 (2013 ed. 1974). Nozick is usually classified as a libertarian rather than a neo-liberal.
Nevertheless, as Raymond Plant notes, Nozick's theories have been influential in the
development of neo-liberalism. See PLANT, supranote 16, at 96.
19. See HAYEK, supra note 17, at 140; MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 67 (1990 ed. 1980); JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS
A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 59 (1993). Murray Rothbard goes so far as to argue that "not
only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights
lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights
are not used as the standard." MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 113 (1982).
See generally DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE'S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE
STATE (1998) (critiquing assumptions behind the welfare state).
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of one's labor." 20 It follows for neoliberals that rights protection should
be limited to traditional civil and political rights that only impose duties
of forbearance (i.e., noninterference).21
The utilitarian objection to socioeconomic rights is based on the
belief that such rights constitute an unacceptable interference with the
"spontaneous order" of the free market.22 On the neoliberal account,
markets are not only an intrinsic expression of freedom but also have
instrumental value as vehicles for welfare maximization, information
coordination and the guarantee of broader political freedom.23 Whereas
the state is regarded as bureaucratic, unresponsive, and inefficient,
markets are held to be flexible, responsive, and self-correcting.24 The
superiority of the market stems from its ability to "spontaneously"
coordinate the dispersed, separate, and partial knowledge of individuals
through the price mechanism and the laws of supply and demand. 25
Markets are threatened by the interventions of central authorities that
seek to achieve particular outcomes because such interventions distort
their information-coordinating capacity. 26 Socioeconomic rights are at
least in part concerned with achieving particular outcomes-for
example, assuring that individuals have access to affordable water-and
therefore favor the distribution of resources according to normative
criteria such as human dignity or need.2 7 To achieve this, a central
authority would have to determine how and on what basis goods and
20. Erich Weede, Human Rights, Limited Government, and Capitalism, 28 CATO J. 35,
47 (2008).
21. It should be noted that the neoliberal argument that social rights impose positive
obligations, whereas civil and political rights only impose negative obligations, is based
upon a false and oversimplified dichotomy that has been largely rejected in the human
rights literature. See, e.g., SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE
RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 66-70 (2008); see also Aoife Nolan et al., The Justiciabilityof
Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal 7 (N.Y.U. Cent. Hum. Rts. Glob.
Justice, Working Paper No. 15, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstractjid=1434944.
22. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 103, 107-32; Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 35, 35 (1993) (arguing against constitutionalized
socioeconomic rights on the basis that they compel governments to interfere with free
markets); Weede, supra note 20, at 40.
23. See HAYEK, supra note 17, at 120; FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 9-38;
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (2002 ed. 1962).
24. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 9-69.
25. See id. at 13-24; HAYEK, supra note 18, at 120.
26. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 128-29.
27. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone is entitled, "as a
member of society," to the realization of "the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10,
1948).
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would be
services should be distributed. The effect of such interference
28
markets.
of
role
information-coordinating
to "distort" the
Hence neoliberals argue for a strict separation of the political sphere
of the state, which has the responsibility of upholding fundamental civil
and political rights, and the economic sphere of the market, which
should be left to its own mechanisms to determine social and economic
entitlement. 29 Particular levels of education, health care, social security,
and so forth are not regarded as legal or moral entitlements, but rather
30
as commodities to be acquired through the market. It follows from this
that neoliberals tend to welcome the cuts to public services currently
being undertaken on the basis that the reduction in state spending and
the privatization of formerly public services create better conditions for
individual freedom and economic efficiency. 31
Advocates of socioeconomic rights contest these arguments. First,
they question why freedom is the sole criterion for rights on the
neoliberal account. Freedom is undoubtedly an important human value,
but it is not the only value: a state of physical and mental well-being,
the ability to participate in democratic life, and substantive equality
amongst citizens are also all important human values that can be
promoted by rights. More fundamentally, however, advocates of
socioeconomic rights question the very account of "freedom" advanced by
neoliberals. They argue that "negative freedom," freedom from coercion,
is not an end in itself, but rather is valuable or instrumental in
achieving a broader and more basic good: autonomy, "living a life
shaped by ones [sic] aims and goals-the exercise of our capacity for
agency." 32 Freedom on this account is not simply the absence of coercion
but rather the ability to exercise genuine choice and act on those
choices. 33 This requires the removal of all sources of "unfreedom,"
34
including poverty, social deprivation, and neglect of public facilities.
As Raymond Plant argues,
28. See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 17; cf. HAYEK, supra note 17, at 75
(arguing that services have "value only to particular people" and not a separate
"determined and ascertainable 'value to society').
29. See TONY EVANS, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 79-80
(2nd ed. 2005).
30. See HAYEK, supra note 18, at 106 ("To establish enforceable rights to the benefits is
not likely to produce them.").
31. Austerity measures that threaten macroeconomic stability may however be subject
to critique within the neoliberallneoclassical paradigm. See Jonathan D. Ostry et al., When
Should Public Debt Be Reduced? 2-7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note 15/10,
2015) (warning against low-risk governments adopting needless austerity measures).
32. See Raymond Plant, Social and Economic Rights Revisited, 14 KINGS COLL. L.J. 1,
16 (2003).
33. See FREDMAN, supranote 21, at 10-16.
34. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (4th prtg. 2000).
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For the capacity for autonomy to exist there has to be a
degree of physical integrity and health insofar as this is
achievable and alterable by human agency; there has to
be an appropriate level of education; and there has to be
an appropriate level of security in terms of income and
social security in that individuals will not develop the
capacity for autonomy if the whole of each individual's
life is devoted to securing the basic means of
subsistence.35
As such, socioeconomic rights are regarded as freedom enhancing
36
rather than freedom reducing.
Like the libertarian objection grounded in negative freedom, the
utilitarian objection to socioeconomic rights has also been subject to
critique. First, the empirical assertion that governmental intervention
in the market reduces aggregate welfare through its "distorting" effect
has been challenged. 37 Indeed, it is widely agreed that it was
government underregulation of the market that was the most
immediate cause, not just of the present economic crisis, but also of
previous ones, such as the 1929 Wall Street Crash or the 1997 Asian
financial crisis. 38 At a deeper level, advocates of human rights question
the aggregative logic of utilitarian calculations in neoclassical
economics. They argue that the fixation with maximizing the aggregate
welfare of society loses sight of individuals as the principle locus of
moral value. 39 Advocates of socioeconomic rights are concerned not only
35. See Plant, supra note 32, at 17.
36. There are a number of other critiques that are outside the scope of this article. The
first is that the neoliberal argument that social rights impose positive obligations,
whereas civil and political rights only impose negative obligations, is based upon a false
and oversimplified dichotomy. See FREDMAN, supra note 21, at 66-70. The other
argument, advanced by Cohen, points out a fundamental contradiction in the neoliberal
account: the neoliberal valorization of private property contradicts their defense of
negative liberty, as property rights require restrictions on the negative liberty of others.
(If X owns a field, she may exclude Y from walking across it, backed by the power of state
coercion, thereby infringing Ys negative liberty to be free of such coercion.) See G.A.
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 38-67 (1995).

37. See, for example, the arguments of Ray Kiely, Neo Liberalism Revised? A Critical
Account of World Bank Concepts of Good Governance and Market Friendly Intervention,
22(1) CAPITAL & CLASS 63 (1998); Richard B. Freeman, Labor Market Institutions and
Policies: Help or Hindrance to Economic Development?, 6 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 117144 (1992); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY EQUALITY IS
BETTER FOR EVERYONE 49-173 (2010)
38. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME REP., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 2-4 (1999).
39. See Margot E. Salomon & Cohn Arnott, Better Development Decision-Making:
Applying InternationalHuman Rights Law to Neoclassical Economics, 32 NORDIC J. HUM.
RTS. 44, 61 (2014).
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with maximizing aggregate welfare but also with the distribution of
welfare gains in ways that respect the inherent dignity of every
individual. In particular, they are concerned that distributional
patterns are not only non-discriminatory but also prioritarian,giving
priority to interests of the most disadvantaged and marginalized
40
members of society.
Having identified some of the core foundational differences between
neoliberal and socioeconomic rights discourses, the next section will
examine some of the principles that govern the international law of
socioeconomic rights and consider their potential as important
counterframes to the neoliberal logic that underpins the current
austerity drive.
B. Socioeconomic Rights Under InternationalLaw
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
foundational constitution of international human rights law, contains
41
civil and political protections as well as socioeconomic guarantees. The
process of translating this declaration into binding international
standards was a protracted affair significantly shaped by the
geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War. 42 The initial unity seen in the
UDHR was fractured into two binding interstate treaties covering
socioeconomic rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),43 and civil and political rights in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).44 Two
separate United Nations (U.N.) committees-the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Human Rights
Committee-monitor the implementation of each of these treaties,
40. See id. at 64; Audrey R. Chapman & Benjamin Carbonetti, Human Rights
Protections for Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups: The Contributions of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 33 HuM. RTS. Q. 682, 683 (2011).
41. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27; see also AM. L. INST.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701, n.6
(1987) (describing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the "accepted
articulation of recognized rights").
42. See Alicia Ely Yamin, The Right to Health Under International Law and Its
Relevance to the United States, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1156, 1156 (2005); see also Office of
the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights (FactSheet No. 33), at 9 (2008).
43. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN[Professionallnterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx [hereinafter ICESCR].
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
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reviewing states on a regular basis and providing guidance through
45
"General Comments."
Despite their historically subordinate status as the "poor cousins" 46
of their civil and political counterparts, 47 socioeconomic rights have
gained in prominence in the last three decades and have been
incorporated in a number of international instruments,48 regional
treaties, 49 and national constitutions,5 0 all of which have helped to
develop "an increasingly expansive" international socioeconomic rights
jurisprudence.5 1 Despite past treatment of socioeconomic rights as mere
nonbinding "aspirations" at best, or as lacking the intrinsic character of

45. The Human Rights Committee monitors the ICCPR and, since 1987, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has monitored the implementation of
the ICESCR. See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 747-49 (1987).
46. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, 2003-4, H.L. 183, H.C.
1188,
163 (U.K.); see also BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 8
(2014); Colim O'Cinneide, Bringing Socio-Economic Rights Back into the Mainstream of
Human Rights: The Case-Law of the European Committee on Social Rights as an Example
of Rigorous and Effective Rights Adjudication (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1543127.
47. See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through
SupranationalAdjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 54 (2006) ('Despite innumerable
proclamations of indivisibility and equality, socioeconomic rights languish far behind their
civil and political counterparts in the pantheon of human rights protection.").
48. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 43; United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, arts. 24-28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13,
2006); United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, arts. 23-31,
UN Doc. A/Res/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989); United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, arts. 10-14, UN Doc.
A/Res/34146 (Dec. 18, 1979).
49. E.g., Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 16, 1999, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights arts. 15-17, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG/67/3
Rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (enumerating the rights to work under satisfactory conditions,
equal pay for equal work, the right to health, and the right to education); European Social
Charter, arts. 1-3, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (outlining the foundation of the
socioeconomic rights to work, to just conditions of work, and to safe and healthy working
conditions).
50. See Malcolm Langford, The Justiciabilityof Social Rights: From Practiceto Theory,
in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (claiming that both constitutions and
international law serve as instruments through which human rights and social values are
vindicated) [hereinafter SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE].
51. Philip Alston, Foreword to SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 50, at x.
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rights at worst, 2 today the status of socioeconomic rights is settled: they
are bona fide legal rights that generate binding normative obligations
53
under international law.
The socioeconomic rights framework applied in this article is based
on the ICESCR. While this is not the only international socioeconomic
rights instrument, it is the oldest, the most widely ratified, and the most
wide-ranging instrument of its kind. The ICESCR contains a number of
rights, including rights to work, to just and favorable conditions of
employment, to form and join trade unions, to social security,- to the
protection of the family, to an adequate standard of living, to healthrelated rights, to education, and to cultural rights. 54 The generally
applicable obligations of State Parties in relation to these rights are set
out in Articles 2 and 3 of the ICESCR. Articles 2(2) and 3 require State
Parties to ensure non-discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of the
rights under the covenant.5 5 Article 2(1) stipulates that
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption
of legislative measures. 56
While the requirements of this rather convoluted obligation were
subject to considerable debate in the past, since 1990 the CESCR have
52. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 88 (Amy

Gutmann ed., 2001); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 113 (1978) (arguing that
socioeconomic rights are negative rights, the type of which honoring "is costly"); MAURICE
CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 37-38 (Taplinger ed. 1973) (1973); Kenneth
Minogue, The History of the Idea of Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 3, 14
(Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1979); Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and
Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43, 43 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1967);
Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 1 (2006)
(suggesting the adjudication of socioeconomic rights disputes as "unmanageable through
the judicial process").
53. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (reprinted
in 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987)); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 5, M.C.H.R. 97-124 (Mar. 4, 1997).
54. See ICESCR, supra note 43, at arts. 6-15.
55. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, General Comment No.
18, 33 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb 6, 2006).
56. Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
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issued "General Comments" and other statements to delineate the
normative content of state obligations under the ICESCR.
This section will briefly outline some of these obligations and
discuss the ways in which they could be useful to challenge the
dominance of austerity policies.
1. ProgressiveRealization and Non-retrogression
The requirement of "progressive realization" set out in Article 2(1) of
the ICESCR imposes an obligation on State Parties "to move as
expeditiously and effectively" to ensuring the fulfilment of socioeconomic
rights. 57 The obligation to realize socioeconomic rights continues to
apply, and is perhaps more pertinent, during times of economic
contraction. 58 As such, the primary obligation on states is to continue to
progressively realize socioeconomic rights at a rate commensurate to the
"maximum available resources" of the state.
Where states cannot (or do not) comply with this obligation to
progressively improve rights realization, a major "corollary" duty is
engaged. 59 This duty-to avoid enacting deliberately "retrogressive
measures"-is said to derive from the obligation to progressively realize
socioeconomic rights. The principle of non-retrogression establishes a
strong presumption against State Parties deliberately adopting laws
and policies that would jeopardize existing achievements in the
realization of socioeconomic rights. 60 The presumption against

57. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of
State Parties' Obligations,
9, U.N. Doc. E/1991123 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter CESCR,
General Comment No. 3].
58. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 4: The Right to
Adequate Housing, 1 11, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991); see also Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. & Cultural Rts., Globalization and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 436-61,
U.N. Doc. E/1999/22-E]C.12/1998/26
(1998); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,
General Comment 2: International Technical Assistance Measures, 9 9, U.N. Doc.
E/1990/23 (1990) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 2].
59. See Illari Aragon Noriega, Judicial Review of the Right to Health and Its
Progressive Realisation: The Case of the Constitutional Court of Peru, 1 UCL J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 166, 172 (2012); Dianne Otto & David Wiseman, In Search of 'Effective
Remedies': Applying the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights
to Australia, 7 AUST. J. HUM. RTS. 5, 44 (2001); Craig M. Scott, Covenant
Constitutionalismand the CanadaAssistance Plan, 6 CONST. F. 79, 81 (1994).
60. See General Comments supra note 58; see also Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: International Consultation "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
the Development Activities of International Institutions" Organized in Cooperation with
the High Council for International Cooperation (France),
8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/6
(Mar. 12, 2001) (by Hamish Jenkins).

CONTESTING AUSTERITY

retrogressive measures has important salience in the context of
austerity measures, which have involved cuts to social protection
systems and other services based in socioeconomic 61rights that have
adversely impacted people's enjoyment of those rights.
Where deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the burden of
proof is on a State Party to demonstrate that a number of conditions
have been met. These conditions have varied throughout the previous
two decades; 62 however, the most recent guidance requires that a
proposed policy change in response to financial crisis must meet a
number of human rights requirements: first, it must be temporary, in
the sense that it covers only the period of crisis; second, it must be
necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other
policy, or failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social,
63
or cultural rights; third, the policy must not be discriminatory; fourth,
the policy should identify the minimum64 core of rights and ensure the
protection of this minimum at all times.
The dual aims of the progressive realization and non-retrogression
obligations are to establish 65"clear obligations" while also being a
"necessary flexibility device." As such, the progressive realization
obligation and especially the doctrine of non-retrogression provide an

61. E.g., Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty,
Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty,
44, 47, U.N. Doc AIHRC/17/34/Add.2, annex (May 17, 2011) (by Magdalena Sepilveda
Carmona).
62. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Comment No. 3, supra note 57; see also,
e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social
Security, 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter CESCR, Comment No.
19]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water,
19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 15];
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, 32, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter CESCR,
General Comment No. 14]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No.
13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter CESCR,
13: The Right to Education,
General Comment No. 13].
63. Discussed further at Part I.B.4. infra.
64. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Letter dated May 16,
2012 from the Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights addressed to
States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. Doc. CESCRI48th/SP/MAB/SW (May 16, 2012); see also, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of Iceland, Adopted by the
6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ISL/CO/4 (Nov. 30, 2012);
Committee at its Forty-Ninth Session,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
8, U.N. Doc.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Spain,
E/C. 12/ESP/CO/5 (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CESCR, Spain].
65. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55.
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"escape hatch" which allow states to reduce protection of socioeconomic
66
rights in some circumstances.
2. Maximum Available Resources
Although attention to state expenditures has grown, 67 in the context
of state incomes, there has been a historical "hesitation" to dealing with
taxation frameworks from a human rights perspective. 68 Sepfilveda,
grounding her analysis in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, notes that the
obligation of governments to realize socioeconomic rights requires that
they must mobilize resources within their country to their utmost
availability. 69 Available resources are not limited to financial resources,
but may also include human and organizational resources.7 0 To that
end, taxation constitutes a vital source of revenue in the context of
utilizing maximum available resources.7 1 The design and structure of a
taxation framework, as well as the State's willingness and ability to
implement and enforce it, is of vital importance in this respect.7 2
One of the controversies in the current period of austerity is that,
while governments justify reductions in social programs on the basis
that they do not have the resources to finance them, large amounts of
tax are often not collected due to weak enforcement, corruption,
criminal tax evasion, and legal strategies of tax avoidance.7 3 Yet a
landmark report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights notes that the effective collection of tax is the most
"straightforward" way of ensuring such rights, as it means that

66. See Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features
of Violations of Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 81, 94 (1998).
67. See Aoife Nolan, Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and
Economic Crisis,4 EUR. HUM. RIGHTS LAW REV. 360-371 (2015) (noting the development
of the CESCR's approach to economic policy).
68. See Magdalena Sepi5lveda, Taxation for Human Rights, 9 TAX JUST. Focus 3, 3
(2014).
69. See M. MAGDALENA SEPUILVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 313-19 (2003).
70. See Diane Elson et al., Public Finance,Maximum Available Resources and Human
Rights, in

HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 13, 15 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013).
71. See RADHIKA BALAKRISHNAN ET AL., MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES & HUMAN

RIGHTS: ANALYTICAL REPORT 3 (2011); Sepijlveda, supra note 68, at 3.
72. SAUL ET AL., supra note 46, at 144.
73. See Wolfgang Obenland, Taxes and Human Rights, 8e INFO STEUERGERECHTIGKEIT
3 (2013).
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governments have sufficient resources for high-quality public services.
justice" are increasingly
For these reasons, demands for "tax
75
issue.
rights
human
a
as
conceptualized
The pressures on state resources are intensified during a financial
crisis. 76 Yet the CESCR has made clear that a crisis or fiscal deficit does
not absolve governments of their obligations to utilize their maximum
available resources to realize socioeconomic rights. Quite the opposite: it
requires that they take extra care in allocating77their available resources
to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups.
The presumed impermissibility of retrogressive measures is
inseparably connected to the requirement that states use the maximum
of their available resources to implement ICESCR rights. The CESCR
has affirmed that, "even in times of severe resources constraints
whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by
other factors the most vulnerable members of society can and indeed
must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted
programmes." 78 Furthermore, if a state uses "resource constraints" as
an explanation for a retrogressive measure, the CESCR will assess the
situation considering, among other factors, the country's level of
development, the severity of the breach, whether the situation
concerned the enjoyment of the minimum core of the rights, and
whether the state had identified low-cost options or sought international
79
assistance.

74. See Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Hum. Rts., Rep. on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, 42, U.N. Doc A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014) (by
Magdalena Sepflveda Carmona).
36-42. See generally Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax
75. See id.
Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE:
BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 77.
76. Additionally, many states started from a weak socio-economic position. Pillay and
Wesson, in the context of South Africa, ask whether the country can be seen as having
experienced, "[a] crisis prior to a crisis." Anashri Pillay & Murray Wesson, Recession,
Recovery and Service Delivery: Political and Judicial Responses to the Financial and
Economic Crisis in South Africa, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS 335, 336 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014).
77. This is reflected in the work of the Committee. See Chairperson of the Comm. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64. See also David Bilchitz, Socio-Economic Rights,
Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine, 12 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 710, 729-33 (2014).
78. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55, 12.
79. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take
Steps to the "Maximum of Available Resources" Under an Optional Protocol to the
Covenant, 110, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (May 10, 2007).
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3. Minimum Core Obligations
In 1990, the CESCR established that "a core obligation" of
immediate effect was to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the
"minimum essential levels" of each of the ICESCR rights.8 0 A
State
Party is prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the
ICESCR where a significant number of individuals under its jurisdiction
are deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education.8 '
Thus, where cuts are made to social security schemes that impinge on
the minimum core of these rights, a State Party is prima facie in breach
of its ICESCR obligations.8 2 The burden of proof then lies with the state
to demonstrate that it has done everything possible to make full use of
all available resources to satisfy these minimum obligations as a matter
of priority.8 3 In the context of austerity, the CESCR has argued that any
policy change or adjustment should identify the minimum core content
of rights, or a social protection floor, as developed by the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), and ensure the protection of this core
content at all times.8 4
4. Non-discriminationand Equality
The ICESCR requires that State Parties ensure that protection of
the rights contained within it is without discrimination of any kind.8 5
Non-discrimination is an immediate obligation that requires not merely
the proscription of arbitrary differentiation between groups but also the
promotion of substantive equality in the enjoyment of rights.8 6 This
obligation requires, inter alia, that states ensure the satisfaction of
socioeconomic rights is available and affordable for all, and that poorer
households are not disproportionately burdened with expenses. 8 7 In
relation to austerity measures, states must demonstrate that they have
taken all possible measures, including tax measures, to support social
80. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 55,

10.

81. See id.
82. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment 19: The Right to
Social Security, supra note 62, 59(a).
83. See id. 60.
84. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., supra note 64.
85. See ICESCR, supranote 43, arts. 2(2), 3.
86. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 20: NonDiscrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
7-9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12GC/20
(May 25, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 20].
87. See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62,
27; CESCR, General
Comment No. 14, supra note 62, 12(b).

CONTESTING AUSTERITY
88
transfers and mitigate the inequalities that can grow in times of crisis.
89
This may require states to adopt progressive tax structures and avoid
regressive sales taxes or value-added taxes that may be incompatible
with these principles given the disproportionate impact they have on
90
those already experiencing financial difficulties.
State Parties are also under an obligation to attenuate laws,
policies, and practices that are indirectly discriminatory:facially neutral
measures which have a disproportionate impact on certain groups'
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. 91 This is a particularly critical
obligation during times of economic and financial crisis, as austerity
been documented to have significant and
have
measures
disproportionate negative impacts on disadvantaged and marginalized
individuals and groups. Particularly affected groups include the poor,
women, children, persons with disabilities, older persons, persons with
HIV/AIDS, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, migrants, refugees,
92
and the unemployed.

5. Obligationsto Respect, Protect, and Fulfil
The CESCR have also used General Comments to advance a
tripartite typology of state obligations. 93 This imposes three "types" or
"levels" of obligations on state parties: to respect, protect, and fulfil.94
The duty to respect requires that states refrain from interfering with
88. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64.
89. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food, 87(e), U.N. Doc. AIHRC/13/33/Add.4, annex (Jan. 26, 2010) (by
Olivier De Schutter). See generally Obenland, supra note 73 (examining how tax policy in
Germany affects human rights); Saiz, supra note 71 (discussing how tax structures can be
adjusted to support human rights principles).
90. Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, supra
note 61, 50; Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rts., supra note 74, at 910.
91. CESCR, General Comment No. 20, supra note 82, 10(b).
92. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 49, U.N. Doc. E/2013/82 (May 7, 2013).
93. See generally Henry Shue, Rights in the Light of Duties, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 65 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds., 1979) (arguing that
human rights impose three core duties on States: the duty to avoid depriving, the duty to
protect from deprivation and the duty to aid the deprived); Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social
And Cultural Rights As Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
TEXTBOOK 21 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that that human rights obligations
can be classified into three categories: the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfil).
94. E.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food, 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); CESCR, General Comment
33;
46; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62,
No. 13, supra note 62,
CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, 20.
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the enjoyment of a right. 95 The duty to protect requires the adoption of
measures to ensure that third parties do not interfere with the
socioeconomic rights of individuals and collectives under the State
Party's jurisdiction. 96 Given the increasing tendency to privatize public
services under conditions of austerity, the duty to protect will at least
require that the state regulate and monitor private service providers to
ensure that the objects of socioeconomic rights remain affordable,
accessible, adequate, and are provided in a non-discriminatory
97
manner.
The duty to fulfil requires states to take positive measures to assist
individuals and communities to enjoy their rights. Such measures are
particularly important in the context of economic crisis, where high
unemployment and rising costs of living can push individuals and
communities further into poverty. Measures that should be adopted to
ensure essential goods are affordable include appropriate low-cost
techniques and technologies; appropriate pricing policies (for instance,
free or low-cost access to goods such as water and services such as
healthcare); and income supplementation. 98 Where individuals are
unable to realize rights for themselves for reasons beyond their
control-for example, having been made redundant-states are obliged
to guarantee the right directly. 99
II.

CONTINGENT LIMITATIONS OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR
CHALLENGING AUSTERITY

In Part I, we argued that the international law of socioeconomic
rights contains a number of principles that can be mobilized to contest
neoliberal austerity measures. Nevertheless, while socioeconomic rights
discourse contains a number of potentially counterhegemonic frames,
there are also a number of limitations to the discourse. Part II will
address two of the contingent limitations, which we define as
shortcomings in socioeconomic rights law as currently constituted that
undermine its effectiveness in challenging austerity measures. We shall
look in turn at the failure of human rights standards to adequately
95. Asbjorn Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights: The Minimum Threshold
Approach, 43 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS REV. 40, 40-41 (1989).
96. See CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, 9 33 (preventing parties from
interfering with the article 12 guarantees to the right to health).
97. E.g., id. 42; CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62,
22, 23; CESCR,
General Comment No. 16, supra note 60, 9 45, 46; see also Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The
Applicability of InternationalHuman Rights Law to Non-State Actors: What Relevance to
Economic, Social and CulturalRights?, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 725, 725-26 (2008).
98. Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, 27.
99. See id. T 25.
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address the responsibilities of transnational actors, and then at
ambiguity in the interpretation of the "non-retrogression" doctrine.
A. Human Rights StandardsFail to Adequately Address the
Responsibilitiesof TransnationalActors
Some critics have questioned the adequacy of traditional,
territorially bounded conceptions of human rights obligations for
addressing the types of violations of socioeconomic rights associated
with neoliberal globalization.10 0 The traditional human rights paradigm
imposes obligations on states to respect, protect, and fulfill the human
rights of those subjects within their territorial jurisdiction. However,
the capacity of states to regulate certain aspects of economic and social
affairs within their own borders has been significantly weakened by
developments in the financial and commodity markets, the consolidation
of global productive capacity by transnational corporations, and the
economic and ideological leverage of international financial institutions
(IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank.101 During the 1990s and 2000s,
much ink was spilled documenting the negative impact on poverty levels
10 2
imposed
and income inequality of "structural adjustment programs"
10 3
by the IMF and World Bank.
Today, IFIs are playing a key role in imposing austerity across
Europe. The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone triggered joint
action by the IMF, the European Commission (EC), and the European
Central Bank (ECB)-often termed the "Troika"-in imposing
budgetary cuts on heavily indebted European nations such as Ireland,
Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 10 4 These measures have had
for
catastrophic--consequences
Greek case,
the
negative-in
socioeconomic rights. A report by the Center for Economic and Social

100. E.g. MICHAL GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALISING WORLD:
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 291-367 (2009) (explaining
the extraterritorial application of treaties on economic, social, and cultural rights).
101. LESLIE SKLAIR, GLOBALIZATION: CAPITALISM & ITS ALTERNATIVES 309 (3d ed. 2002).
102. These were officially reclassified as "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers" after
1999, but they remained fundamentally the same in substance. See Frances Stewart &

Michael Wang, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Within the Human Rights Perspective,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 447, 447-48
(Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
103. See STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INT'L NETWORK, THE POLICY
ROOTS

OF

ECONOMIC

CRISIS

AND

POVERTY:

A

MULTI-COUNTRY

PARTICIPATORY

ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 173-74 (2002); M. RODWAN ABOUHARB &
DAVID CINGRANELLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 135-49 (2007).
104. See Martin McKee et al., Austerity: A FailedExperiment on the People of Europe, 12
CLINICAL MED. 346, 346 (2012).
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Rights concluded that measures adopted by Ireland that were
negotiated by the Troika had "severely reduced enjoyment of a range of
economic and social rights."'105 In his End of Mission Statement to
Greece, the U.N. Independent Expert on Foreign Debt and Human
Rights concluded that the imposition of austerity on Greece had
imposed significant social costs on the Greek people, including high
unemployment, homelessness, poverty, and inequality, as well as
setbacks in the rights to work, social security, health care, and
housing. 10 6 In relation to the far-reaching welfare reforms introduced in
Greece, Manos Matsaganis has noted that, "[w]ith no exceptions,
reforms were forced on reluctant governments . . . and on a (at best)
suspicious public from above, by the Troika."'107
Advocates of socioeconomic rights have argued that the traditional,
territorially bounded and state-centric model of human rights
enforcement creates an "accountability gap" whereby transnational
actors whose actions have an enormous impact on the protection and
promotion of human rights are nevertheless not directly bound by any
human rights obligations. Margot Salomon illustrates the nature of this
accountability gap through an examination of the European Union's
(EU) response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis. 08 The Troika
established a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) through which
consecutive loan agreements have been provided to Greece. 10 9 Continued
support has been conditional on reductions in public spending, drastic
labor market reform, and retrenchment of the welfare state-policies
that have brought extreme poverty and hardship on the Greek people.110

105. CTR. FOR ECON. & Soc. RIGHTS, MAULED BY THE CELTIC TIGER: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
IRELAND'S ECONOMIC MELTDOWN 24 (2012), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland.

briefing. 12.02.2012.pdf.
106. United Nations Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other
Related InternationalFinancialObligationsof States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human
Rights, ParticularlyEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Mr. Cephas Lumina Mission to
Greece, 22-26 April 2013: End of Mission Statement, UNITED NATIONS HuM. RTS. OFFICE
OF THE HIGHER COMM'R (April 26, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/

DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13272&LangID=E.
107. MANOS MATSAGANIS, THE GREEK CRISIS: SOCIAL IMPACT AND POLICY RESPONSES 26

(2013), availableat http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/10314.pdf.
108. See Margot Salomon, Austerity, Human Rights and Europe's Accountability Gap,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrightsblog/margot-salomon/austerity-human-rights-and-eurpe%E2%80%99s-accountabiity-gap
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
109. ESM Programme for Greece, EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, http://www.esm.
europa.eu/assistance/Greece/index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
110. Stuckler and Basu's harrowing account documents the return of HIV and malaria
epidemics to Greece as a result of "health service reforms" required by the Troika. See
STUCKLER & BASU, supra note 10, at 77-94.
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Greece's imposition of these austerity conditionalities led to a
finding by the Council of Europe's European Committee of Social Rights
that Greece had violated the right to social security under the European
Social Charter (ESC).11 Yet, as Salomon notes, the IFIs that imposed
these austerity conditions upon Greece were able to avoid any human
rights accountability for their actions because the ESC only binds
ratifying states and not international organizations. 112 Furthermore, the
ESM was constituted as a separate international organization rather
than as an EU agency, which means that the ESM Member States are
not applying EU law and thus are not bound by the socioeconomic rights
guarantees contained in the EU Charter. 113 The upshot is that human
rights claims can only be bought against "enfeebled governments" but
not the transnational actors that enforce "disciplinary neoliberalism" on
114
them.
Two proposed reforms to dominant understandings of human rights
obligations are put forward to plug this gap. The first argues that
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as legal personalities
under international law, are directly bound to at least respect the rights
contained within the ICESCR in their operations.11 5 Whatever the
correctness of this legal argument is, it should be noted that
representatives of these institutions have staunchly resisted any
imposition of binding human rights standards. 116 The second line of
111. See Fed'n of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v. Greece, 57 Eur. H.R.
Rep. (ser. 2) 34, 49-50 (2012).
112. Margot E. Salomon, Of Austerity, Human Rights and InternationalInstitutions, 21
EUR. L. J. 521, 528-31 (2015); see also Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social
Rights Violations by Non-state Actors Through the Role of the State: A Comparison of
Regional Approaches to the "Obligationto Protect" 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226-30 (2009)
(surveying regional human rights bodies' practices regarding State responsibility for
violations of economic and social rights by non-state actors).
113. See Salomon, supra note 108, at 532-37. Socioeconomic rights are contained within
Chapter IV of the Charter. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ch.
IV, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 15-17.
114. "Disciplinary Neoliberalism" is the term Stephen Gill uses to describe the role
played by transnational structures to expand the scope and increase the power of marketbased structures and forces so that governments and other economic agents are
disciplined by market mechanisms. See Stephen Gill, Globalisation,Market Civilisation,
and DisciplinaryNeoliberalism,24 MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 399, 399-400 (1995).
115. See, e.g., SIGRUN I SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK
AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 125-36 (2001); JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT
FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LESSONS LEARNED 84-90 (2010).
116. See, e.g., IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTOR PANEL: IN PRACTICE
241 (2d ed. 2000) ("There is no legal obligation on the part of the Bank or its staff to
guarantee that the project it finances will succeed or will not cause any harm to any
party."); Willem van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights:
About Direct Obligations and the Attribution of Unlawful Conduct, in CHALLENGING
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argument is that the individual states that make up organizations such
as the World Bank and IMF should be held accountable for the
"extraterritorial" violations of human rights that they cause
or
contribute to by their conduct vis-A-vis these organizations, particularly
the rich states that wield disproportionate power and influence within
them. 117 There is some textual support for this argument within the
ICESCR, as well as the jurisprudence of the CESCR.
In respect of the ICESCR, two points can be made. First, the
ICESCR, unlike the majority of international human rights treaties,
makes no explicit mention of the scope of its territorial application. 1 8
Whereas Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights imposes obligations on State Parties to respect and
ensure the rights of all individuals "within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction," there is no mention of territory or jurisdiction in the
wording of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.119 Second, there is an explicit
reference within Article 2(1) of the ICESCR to international assistance
and cooperation as a means to achieve the full realization of the rights
provided by the covenant. This reference to international assistance and
cooperation is reiterated in several other articles. 120
Furthermore, the CESCR has established in its General Comments
that State Parties to the ICESCR have a number of international
obligations. From General Comment No. 14 onwards, the CESCR has
consistently used mandatory language to express the international
obligations of states to respect and protect the enjoyment of ICESCR
rights of people in third countries ("have to"), while obligations to fulfill

TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAw: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE
DUTY-BEARER REGIME 44, 45-47 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015); FRANCOIS GIANVITI,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY FUND paras.
10-30 (2002), http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/gianv3.pdf (arguing
that the ICESCR does not apply to the IMF).
117. See, e.g., Smita Narula, International Financial Institutions, Transnational
Corporations and Duties of States, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114, 115-16 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2012); Radhika
Balakrishnan & James Heintz, ExtraterritorialObligations, Financial Globalisationand
Macroeconomic Governance, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS 146, 147-52 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014).
118. On the implications of not mentioning the scope of ICESCR's territorial
applications, see MARGOT E. SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-77 (2007).
119. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), supra note
44, with International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1), supra
note 43.
120. See ICESCR, arts. 11(2), 15(4), 22, 23, supra note 43.
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For
have been expressed in recommendatory language ("should").
that:
held
has
CESCR
the
to
health,
right
example, in relation to the

To comply with their international obligations in
relation to article 12, States parties have to respect the
enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and
to prevent third parties from violating the right in other
countries, if they are able to influence these third parties
by way of legal or political means, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and applicable
international law. Depending on the availability of
resources, States should facilitate access to essential
health facilities, goods and services in other countries,
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when
122
required.
This robust language would indicate that Member States acting
within IFIs such the IMF and World Bank have mandatory obligations
to respect and protect socioeconomic rights, such that they may not
formulate loan conditionalities or other lending policies that will
negatively impact the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights in the recipient
country. At a minimum, this might require IFIs to engage in some basic
12 3
consultation on the projected socioeconomic effects of their policies.
Unfortunately however, whenever the CESCR expressly mentions the
obligations of States Parties as Member States of IFIs, it qualifies the
nature of their extraterritorial obligations in recommendatory language
("should"):
Accordingly, States parties which are members of
the
institutions, notably
international financial
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
regional development banks, should pay greater
attention to the protection of the right to health in

31, 36; see also id. 1
121. E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62,
20-29 (discussing the taxonomy duties to respect, protect, and fufill).
122. CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, 1 39 (emphasis added).
123. See Salomon, supra note 108, at 530 (discussing how consultation was sometimes
omitted or prevented from taking place).
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influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and
24
international measures of these institutions. 1
This is a particularly weakly worded obligation. First, it is nonmandatory ("should"); second, it is ambiguously relativized ("greater"but in relation to what?); and third, its terms could be satisfied in an
entirely tokenistic way. For example, greater attention could be paid to
the right to health in lending policies and then simply be ignored in
policy formulation. This is an extremely important point, as the policy
design of conditional loans can have severe adverse impacts on a
country's capacity to ensure socioeconomic rights. 125 As Stuckler and
Basu show in their harrowing account, the "health service reforms" and
budget cuts imposed on Greece by the Troika have had disastrous
consequences on the nation's health, including helping to foster the
return of HIV and malaria epidemics. 126 Such dire health indicators in
any European nation would have been scarcely imaginable a few years
ago.
The jurisprudence of the CESCR is therefore ambiguous in terms of
the strength of the obligations of States Parties within IFIs. This is
most unfortunate in light of the considerable influence, evident in the
Greek case, that IFI activity has on States Parties' abilities to comply
with their obligations under international socioeconomic rights
instruments. It is hoped that, with the maturation of the Optional
Protocol to the ICESCR, a more detailed and concretized jurisprudence
with regard to extraterritorial application of socioeconomic rights will be
developed through periodic reporting procedures, individual complaints,
and inquiry procedures. 127 This path, however, is likely to be a slow one.
To date 128 there are only twenty-one parties to the Optional Protocol
and, as Eide Riedel, member of the CESCR from 1997 to 2012, has
argued,
124. CESCR, General Comment No. 14, supra note 62, 39 (emphasis added); see also
CESCR, General Comment No. 15, supra note 62,
31, 235; CESCR, General Comment
No. 19, supra note 62,
53, 58.
125. In her account of conditionality in the Greek case, Salomon notes the highly
prescriptive nature of the Troika conditions including, for example, a requirement to
"[e]liminate pension bonuses." Salomon, supra note 108, at 528-29.
126. See STUCKLER & BASu, supra note 10, at 77, 87. See generally RICK ROWDEN, THE
DEADLY IDEAS OF NEOLIBERALISM: HOW THE IMF HAS UNDERMINED PUBLIC HEALTH AND

THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS (2009) (discussing the interplay between neoliberal economics
and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases related to poverty).
127. See generally Ashfaq Khalfan, Accountability Mechanisms, in GLOBAL JUSTICE,
STATE DUTIES:

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 117, at 391 (discussing the ways in which
IESCR could compel nations to comply with socioeconomic rights regulations).
128. Dec. 9, 2015.
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[T]he Committee should take great care not to overstep
its role once the Optional Protocol [comes into] force ....
It would be wise to choose micro-level issues first and
keep away from macro-issues such as extraterritorial
application of [the] ICESCR .... This would definitely
129
frighten off many states from ratifying.
In the interim period, the CESCR could adopt a new, more detailed
General Comment addressing the question of the extraterritorial scope
of socioeconomic rights, building on recent scholarly work in the area,
to questions of jurisdiction, causation, and division
especially pertaining
30
of responsibility. 1
B. Ambiguity of the Concept of "Non-retrogression"
As outlined above, a major component of the ICESCR obligation to
"progressively realize" socioeconomic rights is the obligation to avoid
reductions in the protection of these rights. Given the propensity of
131
the
austerity programs to reduce enjoyment of socioeconomic rights,
done.
damage
the
limit
to
potential
clear
duty of non-retrogression has
A strong version of non-retrogression can "lock in" rights protection and
counter the logic of austerity. 132 The core of this duty of nonretrogression is a presumption against backwards steps or "backsliding"
in the protection of rights. 133 States wishing to enact such a
129. ILIAS BANTEKAS & LUTZ OETTE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE
217 (2013).

130. See generally Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the MaastrichtPrinciples
on ExtraterritorialObligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012) (commenting on the key themes, strengths, and
weaknesses of the Maastricht Principles); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL

SCOPE

OF

ECONOMIC,

SOCIAL

AND

CULTURAL

RIGHTS

IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 117 (examining the state of international law on
extraterritorial obligations in the context of economic, social, and cultural rights).
131. See generally James Harrison & Mary-Ann Stephenson, Assessing the Impact of the
Public Spending Cuts: Taking Human Rights and Equality Seriously, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

219 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013) (surveying various austerity measures nations have
undertaken and how such measures affect the nations' respective citizens).
132. See Aoife Nolan et al., Two Steps Forward,No Steps Back? Evolving Criteriaon the
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic and Social Rights, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 121, 128-29 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014). See

generally Joe Wills, The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic
Rights, and Hegemony, 27 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 11 (2014) (discussing the ways in which
austerity must temporarily and proportionately affect a nation to preserve human rights).
133. See Jill Cottrell & Yash Ghai, The Role of the Courts in the Protectionof Economic,
Social & Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: THE
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retrogressive measure have the burden of proving that the measure is
justified according to criteria set down by the CESCR.34 Yet the criteria
against which states are tested have been subject to frequent change.
The resulting lack of clarity, and the CESCR's weak examination of the
obligation, has caused the principle of non-retrogression to be of limited
effect in challenging austerity measures. 135
In various statements the CESCR has outlined multiple versions of
the criteria that it will use in testing for a retrogressive measure. From
a modest starting point in 1991, the CESCR's doctrine of nonretrogression developed into a more fully textured obligation in the
period from 1999 to 2007.136 Although the committee originally only
required states to justify retrogressive measures by reference to the
"totality of rights" and to use the maximum of available resources in
order to avoid a finding of an impermissible retrogressive measure,137
the list of criteria later expanded. By November 2007, the CESCR had
developed some seven factors that would purportedly be examined:
whether there was a "reasonable justification" for the measure; whether
the State had examined alternative measures; whether the measure had
been justified by reference to other ICESCR rights; whether there had
been participation of affected groups in devising the policy; whether the
measures were in any way discriminatory; whether there would be a
sustained or unreasonable impact resulting from the measure; and
whether there had been independent review of the measure. 138
However, this relatively comprehensive framework was subject to
significant revisions in 2012 when the chairperson of the CESCR
released a letter addressing the financial and economic crises. 39 That
letter purported to substantially alter the test for a retrogressive
measure. 140 The committee noted that, to avoid enacting a retrogressive
measure, states' measures
should be temporary, necessary,
proportionate, non-discriminatory, and must not infringe the minimum
core of the right.' 4 ' This is a clear weakening of earlier standards. Such
an alteration of the standards of scrutiny is particularly concerning
ROLE OF JUDGES IN IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS 58, 61 (Yash

Ghai & Jill Cottrell eds., 2004); see also Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 123.
134. See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 13, supra note 62, 45.
135. See Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 140.
136. This began with the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See
CESCR, General Comment No. 13, supra note 62, 45.
137. See CESCR, General Comment No. 3, supra note 57, 9.
138. See CESCR, General Comment No. 19, supra note 62, 42.
139. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64.
140. See Ben TC Warwick, Socio-Economic Rights During Economic Crises: A Changed
Approach to Non-Retrogression,65 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 249, 257 (2016).
141. See Chairperson of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64.
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given the context of wide-reaching austerity programs and raises the
question of why a period of retrenchment for socioeconomic rights was
seen as the appropriate juncture for such changes.
While there remains a need for greater conceptual clarity around
non-retrogression 142 and, in particular, a reversal of the weak position
taken in the 2012 letter, a balance must be struck between change and
stability. It is likely that the regular variation of the doctrine of nonretrogression over the past fifteen years has contributed somewhat to its
weak enforcement in the CESCR's examinations of State Parties. Only
infrequently has the CESCR addressed the issue of retrogression in its
Concluding Observations on state compliance. 143 On these occasions the
committee has been tentative about finding a violation of the obligation,
opting instead to remind states of their obligations. 144 Stability in the
terms of the doctrine is likely to be beneficial in addressing this
enforcement gap. With the progress of states being examined
approximately every five years, 145 having a constantly shifting set of
criteria for such a key general obligation lends little certainty to the
CESCR or to states about the scope of non-retrogression, or the
standard against which examinations are made.
The choice to modify the doctrine of non-retrogression in the midst
of a wave of austerity programs meant, in concrete terms, that the
CESCR's changes were introduced in the same biannual session of the
142. See Nolan et al., supra note 132, at 121-22.
143. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the

Combined Fourth and Fifth Reports of Bulgaria, Adopted by the Committee at its FortyNinth Session, 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BGRICO/R.4-5 (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter CESCR,
Bulgaria]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: New Zealand, 17, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/NZLICO/3 (May 31, 2012); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding

Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 12/DEU/CO/5 (May 20, 2011); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding

Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Canada,

52,

U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (May 22, 2006); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,

Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Chile, 56, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Dec. 1, 2004); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rts., Concluding Observationsof the Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights:
Mauritius, 16, U.N. Doc. EIC.12/1994/8 (May 31, 1994) [hereinafter CESCR, Mauritius];
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights: Hungary, 152, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1992/2 (1992).
144. This is especially the case in recent years. Compare CESCR, Mauritius,supra note
143 (admonishing directly "the re-introduction of fees at the tertiary level of education,
which constitutes a deliberately retrogressive step"), with CESCR, Bulgaria, supra note

143 (reminding States to "avoi[d] any retrogressive step with regard to the protection of
workers' labor rights.").
145. WOUTER VANDENHOLE, THE PROCEEDURES BEFORE THE UN TREATY BODIES:
DIVERGENCE OR CONVERGENCE? 126 (2004).
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committee that saw the examination of the significant and high-profile
austerity measures of the Spanish state. 146 The timing of this change
limited the committee to doing little more than "draw[ing] the State
party's attention" to its modified standards on non-retrogression. 147
It is also a matter of concern that analysis of retrogression is largely
absent from the ICESCR reporting guidelines.1 48 These guidelines
request information on key aspects of a state's performance of their
socioeconomic rights obligations. However, at present, states are not
required to submit information, justifications, or explanation on any
backwards steps that have been enacted in the period under
examination. 49 Such an omission reduces the CESCR's ability to
systematically hold states accountable and prevents the committee from
subjecting socioeconomic-rights-reducing policies to a full examination.
In the context of widespread austerity programs, where there are more
frequent occurrences of backwards steps, there is even greater value to
such information being provided.
Furthermore, this information must be appropriately circumscribed
in order to be of use to the CESCR in its monitoring. Examples abound
of national situations for which there are more general statistical
indicators which raise issues of concern, but for which the specific
information needed in order to demonstrate retrogression is limited.
Thus there is much awareness, for instance, of the fact that health
services in Ireland were subject to significant budget cuts at a time
when need for the services was on the increase. 5I 0 Yet the doctrine of
non-retrogression
does not
extend to preventing "economic
constraints,"'15 but rather relies on showing some specific deterioration
of rights standards. This necessitates a more focused statistical account
of the enjoyment of some aspect of the right to health during the period
of austerity.

146. In fact, the Letter containing the guidance was released on May 16, 2012-eight
days after Spain had been examined by the Committee.
147. See CESCR, Spain, supra note 64.
148. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Guidelines On Treaty-Specific
Documents To Be Submitted By States Parties Under Articles 16 And 17 Of The
InternationalCovenant On Economic, Social And CulturalRights, U.N. Doc E/C. 12/2008/2
(Mar. 24, 2009).
149. See id.
150. See ANNE NOLAN ET AL., EUR. OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS & POLICIES, THE
IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTH IN IRELAND 1 (2014);

CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, supra note 105, at 5.
151. This point is taken to its height in Mary Dowell-Jones, The Economics of the
Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some Human Rights Arguments, 15 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 193,
197 (2015).
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While demanding greater information on retrogressive policies and
ensuring a degree of doctrinal stability are important to ensuring a
more robust response to harmful backwards steps brought about by
austerity, the system of state reporting described here is a sluggish and
fundamentally retrospective exercise. States report to the CESCR
around every five years, and, although there is a degree of chance
152
inherent in when during a period of austerity this examination falls,
such a length of time is significant when compared to the rapidity of
some austerity programs. The time period between state examinations
is sufficient to allow an austerity program to "take hold," and, even
following a finding of retrogression by the CESCR, such delays might
make reversal of enacted and embedded policies more difficult.
Two other methods besides cyclical state examinations offer greater
responsiveness in challenging austerity measures on the basis of
socioeconomic rights. The first is the individual-complaint mechanism,
recently in force, which allows individuals to bring a "case" against a
state which has ratified the terms of the Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR. 153 Although currently only twenty-one states have ratified the
protocol, 154 as the number of ratifications grows, the number of
complaints is also likely to grow. 155 Strategic litigation offers the
potential for impermissible retrogressive measures to be identified by
the CESCR much sooner after their enactment, and for the impacts of
austerity on socioeconomic rights to be addressed more quickly. The
second method, which might allow for more timely interventions,
requires the CESCR to provide further examples of, and greater detail
on, the kinds of measures that it will find to be retrogressive. Currently,
15 6
the only clear example given relates to the right to work. By providing
further points of comparison in General Comments, Concluding
152. For example, by chance Spain fell to be examined relatively soon after it began its
austerity program (austerity underway 2011; examined 2012), whereas Ireland (austerity
underway 2011; examined 2015) and the UK (austerity underway 2010; examined 2016)
have had a longer period of austerity without having been examined by the CESCR.
153. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).
154. 3.a) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/iv-3-a.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
155. See Table Of Pending Cases Before The Committee On Economic, Social And
Cultural Rights, Considered Under The Optional Protocol To The InternationalCovenant
On Economic, Social And Cultura[sic] Rights (OP-CESCR), OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R
FOR

HUM.

RTS.,

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/PendingCases.aspx

(last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
34, U.N. Doc.
156. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 18,
E/C.12/GC/18 (Nov. 24, 2005) ("An example would be the institution of forced labor or the
abrogation of legislation protecting the employee against unlawful dismissal.").
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Observations, and in its Optional Protocol jurisprudence, the CESCR
would aid rights advocates working in national settings to make wellfounded cases against proposed retrogressive measures. Such actions
are crucially important in addressing potential socioeconomic rights
violations ex ante, before harms have resulted.
III.

STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR
CHALLENGING AUSTERITY

In Part II, we discussed two contingent limitations of appeals to
socioeconomic rights law. Such limitations could conceivably be
overcome through the clarification of existing standards (better and
more consistent definition of the meaning of non-retrogression) or
extending their reach (to include transnational actors). There are,
however, a number of structural features of socioeconomic rights law
which limit its ability to challenge austerity and are trickier to
surmount. These are the more fundamental presuppositions and axioms
that frame socioeconomic rights law which ignore and naturalize the
factors and forces that drive the current austerity measures. We call
these structurallimitations.
The limitations of legal human rights discourse have been well
documented in critical legal theory. Human rights are argued to be too
narrow and legalistic as a discourse to be used to challenge the
systematic and material bases for social deprivation that are governed
by the systemic logic and organization of the global political economy. 157
Such arguments are concerned that rights discourse channels
oppositional movements into technical legal disputes around peripheral
questions and diverts attention away from the need for meaningful
social and political transformations.158 Human rights challenges,
particularly in the form of litigation, often revolve around relatively
narrow issues, while underlying structural factors (political, social,
cultural, and economic) are generally left unaddressed. 159 It is true that
in recent years, a number of human rights scholars have been
developing tools and models to apply socioeconomic rights standards

157. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIANISM 11-13 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2005); see also NAOMI KLEIN, THE
SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 118-28 (2008); Samuel Moyn, A
Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 147, 147-52.
158. See KENNEDY, supra note 157 ('The strong attachment of the human rights
movement to the legal formalization of rights and the establishment of legal machinery for
their implementation makes the achievement of these forms an end in itself.").
159. See id. at 10-13.

CONTESTING AUSTERITY

659

more broadly to fiscal policy.160 While undoubtedly a step forward and a
valuable contribution to expanding the lens of socioeconomic rights
analysis, these models can only address distributive patterns and state
policies, but not the underlying forces and factors that drive those
patterns and policies.
What are the underlying structural factors associated with the
current austerity drive? Robin Blackburn argues that the current
financial crisis is the culmination of a number of trends strongly
promoted by neoliberal globalization: "extreme inequality, poverty,
financial deregulation, privatization and a pervasive commodification of
the life course, via mortgages, credit-card debt, student fees and private
pensions."'16 1 Rising inequality both within and between countries led to
low wages in emerging economies and growing indebtedness and
extreme concentration of wealth in established economies, which, taken
in conjunction with the deregulation of financial markets, allowed
investment banks and hedge funds, heedless of the consequences, to
pursue short-term advantage through expanded credit schemes.162 This
in turn generated the succession of asset bubbles that created the
current crisis. Marxist political economists like David Harvey have
argued financial crises like the current one are an inherent and
163
Legal
recurrent feature in the workings of the capitalist system.
these
to
addressing
is
ill-suited
socioeconomic rights discourse
little
it
has
but
symptoms,
certain
address
it
may
structural dynamics;
inevitably
a
problem
diagnose
to
fully
failure
A
to say about root causes.
means that the prescriptions will be limited or ephemeral.
Legal socioeconomic rights discourse is also limited in its perception
of power dynamics. In human rights analysis, the identification of a
violator, violation, and remedy is foregrounded, while broader relations
164
Susan Marks
and structures of power are bracketed or minimized.
has suggested that the identification of human rights violators can often
165
obscure the question of who the beneficiariesof such violations are. As

160. See, e.g., RORY O'CONNELL ET AL., APPLYING AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK TO STATE BUDGET ALLOCATIONS: RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (2014).

161. Blackburn, supra note 7, at 35.
162. See id.
163. See generally DAVID HARVEY, SEVENTEEN CONTRADICTIONS AND THE END OF
CAPITALISM (2014).
164. See Alicia Eli Yamin, The Future in the Mirror: IncorporatingStrategies for the
Defense and Promotion of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream
Human Rights Agenda, 27 HUM. RTs. Q. 1200, 1221 (2005).
165. See generally Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57,
70-74 (2011) (suggesting that much human rights analysis still treats abuses as
contingent phenomena rather than the necessary outcomes of particular systemic or
material arrangements).
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Thomas Pogge has argued, material deprivation is not natural or
inevitable but rather something that is happening as the result of a
particular "global institutional order designed for the benefit of the
affluent countries' governments and corporations, and of the poor
countries' military and political elites." 166 Denials of basic socioeconomic
rights are not "accidents" nor are they "random in distribution and
effect." 167 Rather they are, as Paul Farmer has put it, "symptoms of
deeper pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social
conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be
shielded from harm."16 8 It is no coincidence that Western governments
responded to their economic crises by providing liquidity for the
financial elites while cutting services that the poor and vulnerable rely
upon. Nor is it a coincidence that
[A]t the very same time we see millions of people pushed
further into penury through conscious state policy (with
all the right-denying effects that this has), we also see
the number of wealthy people around the world steadily
increasing, as well as governments introducing
"business friendly" tax regimes . . . . [Austerity] now
provides a pretext for a more brutal and extensive
application of the inegalitarian logics inherent within
69
neoliberal capitalism.1
In other words, neoliberalism functions, as David Harvey argues, to
serve "the interests of private property owners, businesses,
multinational corporations, and financial capital." 170 An atomizing focus
on violations and remedies alone cannot identify these patterned logics,
nor can it prescribe meaningful long term solutions to them.
In one sense, this observation is not new. Indeed, the U.N. human
rights system is expressly premised on the understanding that the legal
and political are entirely distinct categories, and it is the function of its
human rights bodies to clarify, monitor, and enforce the content of

166. Thomas Pogge, Recognized and Violated by InternationalLaw: The Human Rights
of the Global Poor, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 717, 740 (2005).
167. Amartya Sen, Foreword to PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR xiii (2003).

168. Id. at 7.
169. Paul O'Connell, Let Them Eat Cake: Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of Austerity,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC AND

SOCIAL RIGHTS 59, 65-67 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013).
170. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 7 (2005).
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international legal norms while remaining neutral on questions of a
political nature. 171 This is the position of the CESCR, which insists that
in terms of political and economic systems the Covenant
is neutral and its principles cannot accurately be
described as being predicated exclusively upon the need
for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist
system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laisser-faire
172
economy, or upon any other particular approach.
However, the broader point to be made here is that casting legal
doctrine as politically neutral is "at best a sleight of hand," for it is
"precisely in acting as though law were neutral that legal discourse
operates ideologically, not merely masking social inequalities but
making those inequalities appear the inevitable concomitant to a
neutral and impartial legal order."1 73 We can see the operation of this
"sleight of hand" in the jurisprudence of the CESCR, which, despite its
insistence of political neutrality, ends up embracing a variant of
neoliberalism that has been termed the "Post-Washington Consensus"

(PWC).174
The CESCR has, in the face of overwhelming evidence, expressed
concern about and criticism of the impact of adjustment measures and
rights on numerous occasions.175
austerity on socioeconomic
171. See, e.g., Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. on the 5th WTO
Ministerial Conference.
Cancdn, Mexico 10-14 September 2003: Human Rights and Trade, at 4 (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlissues/globalization/trade/docs/5WTOMinisterial
Cancun.pdf.
172. CESCR, General Comment No. 3, supra note 57, 8.
173. Tor Krever, InternationalCriminal Law: An Ideology Critique,26 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 701, 704-05 (2013).
174. According to Joseph Stiglitz, the Post-Washington Consensus represents the
realization that making markets work requires sound financial regulation, competition
policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology. It also envisions a role for the
state in social protection and welfare. See Jospeh E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President &
Chief Economist, The World Bank Group, Keynote Address: More Instruments and
Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus (Jan. 7, 1998), in Ger.
Found. Int'l Dev. Villa Borsig Workshop Series, 1999, at 11, 27.
175. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
43,
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Algeria,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.71 (Nov. 30, 2001); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Venezuela, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.56 (May 21, 2001); Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
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Nevertheless it also recognizes "that adjustment programmes will often
be unavoidableand that these will frequently involve a major element of
austerity." 176 The CESCR does not regard austerity to be necessarily
incompatible with the realization of socioeconomic rights.177 Rather, it
has argued that such measures must be compensated for by approaches
which enhance the compatibility of those trends and policies with full
respect for socioeconomic rights. 178 In response to the current wave of
austerity measures, the chairperson of the CESCR has acknowledged
"the pressure on many States Parties to embark on austerity
programmes . . . in the face of rising public deficit and poor economic
growth" and notes further that "the Committee is acutely aware that
this may lead many States to take decisions with sometimes painful
effects." 179 While some retrogression in the enjoyment of socioeconomic
rights is "inevitable," it must be compatible with state obligations under
the ICESCR.180 In short, the CESCR supports "adjustment with a
human face."18'
To make these observations is not necessarily to criticize the
CESCR; given the limits of their mandate within the state-centric U.N.
human rights system, the most pragmatic path for them to take may be
to adopt a stance that scrutinizes austerity measures and holds
governments accountable for the ways in which they implement it when
they do. Indeed, in Part I.B above, we argued that the CESCR have
developed a number of principles that are useful for doing just that.
However, the stance adopted by the CESCR does indicate the limits of
international socioeconomic rights law: not only does it not allow for
broad political critique of these policy trends, it may also contribute to
normalizing and naturalizing austerity measures by describing them as
"unavoidable" and "inevitable." This is the general paradox of "political
neutrality": failing to take a stance in relation to a dominant political
trend can be to politically acquiesce to that trend.
and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Egypt,
10, 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44 (May 23, 2000).
176. CESCR, General Comment No. 2, supra note 58, 9.
177. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Globalization and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra note 58,
515.2, 515.3 ("[Globalization] has also come to be
closely associated with a variety of specific trends and policies, including an increasing
reliance upon the free market .... a diminution in the role of the State and the size of its
budget, . . . and a corresponding increase in the role and even responsibilities attributed to
private actors .... None of these developments in itself is necessarily incompatible with
the principles of the Covenant or with the obligations of Governments thereunder.").
178. See id. 515.4 ("All of these risks can be guarded against, or compensated for, if
appropriate policies are put in place.").

179. See Chairperson of the U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., supra note 64.
180. Id.
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Austerity is neither natural nor "inevitable": it is the product of a
particular political-economic order and the conscious political choice of
governments and intergovernmental organizations. Legal socioeconomic
rights norms can serve as a useful standard to measure and critique the
adverse human impact of these policies. But they can only go so far. As
Robin Blackburn, talking about human rights more generally, so
eloquently put it,
"Human rights" can serve as a valuable watchword and
measure. But because inequality and injustice are
structural, constituted by multiple intersecting planes of
capitalist accumulation and realization, more needs to
be said--especially in relation to financial and corporate
power and how these might be curbed and socialized.
The plight of billions can be represented as a lack of
effective rights, but it is the "property question"-the
fact that the world is owned by a tiny elite of
expropriators-that is constitutive of that plight. The
slogan of rights takes us some way along the path; but it
alone cannot pose the property question relevant to the
182
21st century.
CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that many of the principles underscoring
international socioeconomic rights law can serve as useful discursive
tools for contesting neoliberal driven austerity measures. The principles
of progressive realization, non-retrogression, maximum available
resource mobilization, non-discrimination, equality, minimum core
duties, participation, and accountability were argued to constitute
important counterframes to the neoliberal fixation on economic growth,
efficiency, and competitiveness. However, the paper also argued that
there are a number of limitations to appeals to socioeconomic rights
discourse to challenge austerity, most notability its inability to address
the structural forces that drive these policy choices or to articulate the
radical forms of transformation that will be needed to overcome them.
These identified shortcomings should not, however, form the basis
for the rejection of socioeconomic rights discourse altogether. They
should rather be the impetus for a "two-track" approach to
socioeconomic rights. The first track is tactical: this involves mobilizing
182. Robin Blackburn, Reclaiming Human Rights, 69 NEW LEFT REV. 126, 137-38
(2011).
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and reforming current discourses of socioeconomic rights so as to make
them better vehicles for contesting neoliberal policy measures. This will
require, amongst other things, clarifying the principle of nonretrogression, and seeking to apply socioeconomic rights standards to
transnational actors (if not in law then at least in political discourse).
The second track is strategic: this consists of linking socioeconomic
rights discourses to counterhegemonic political discourses that
articulate attempts to move beyond the neoliberal logic of austerity.18 3
The recent emergence of anti-austerity movements such as the Coalition
of the Radical Left ("Syriza") in Greece, Podemos in Spain, a socialist
coalition government in Portugal, a revived social democratic Labour
Party in the United Kingdom, and the Scottish National Party in
Scotland, as well as a variety of grassroots and popular movements
across Europe, shows that a continent-wide movement against austerity
is growing.184 Socioeconomic rights advocates should work with
grassroots campaigns and political movements against austerity,
identifying intersections between these groups' demands and the
principles established in socioeconomic rights law.

183. See generally Robert Knox, Strategy and Tactics, 21 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 193
(2010) (distinguishing tactical and strategic engagements with the law).
184. Europe's Anti-austerity Movements: From Podemos to the SNP, CHANNEL 4 NEWS,
http://www.channel4.com/news/europes-anti-austerity-movements-from-podemos.to-thesnp (last visited May 5, 2016).

